The Spanish Civil War: Myths and Lies

No episode in the 1930s have been more lied about than this one, and only
in recent years have historians begun to dig it out from the mountain of mendacity beneath which it was buried for a generation.
Paul Johnson, Modern Times

Paul Johnson could have extended his judgment to most of Spain’s history, because the myths and lies about Spain didn’t begin with the 1936-1939 civil war and didn’t stop at its end, they remained during the Franco dictatorship and after the transition to democracy in 1975, and they continue today. There is an unabashed revision of the history of Spain, an effort led by British and Spanish left-wing historians in order to paint as bad a picture of the country as possible, one that benefits its main enemies: the Spanish revolutionary left and the Basque and Catalan separatist movements, both wanting revenge from their historic defeat in the civil war, both wanting to erase their past to show themselves as democratic movements.

The biggest lie of the civil war, one that has found a place of honor in contemporary history, is that the Popular Front was fighting for the Spanish Republic, that it was the Republic. This is one of the great propaganda successes of the 20th century, a triumph of Stalin and the Spanish Communist Party. As Stanley G. Payne writes, the Spanish Civil War has been presented to the world as a clear fight between democracy and fascism, but this is pure leftist propaganda. The Popular Front called themselves (and were called by the nationalists) “the Reds.” They succeeded in building a short-lived society similar to the Soviet Union and tried to dismember Spain into small fiefdoms. On the opposite side, the nationalists and General Franco have been presented as fascists by leftist propaganda, when in reality they were fighting for a united, traditional and Catholic Spain. (Moa, Cita 26 all; Cita 70, 9:18)

How the Civil War Really Developed

1931. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and its leftist allies win the election. As soon as they got power, the Socialists and anarchists began burning churches, murdering priests, and raping nuns. The rights of Catholics were severely restricted, the Jesuits were expelled from the country, and there were plans to prohibit religious orders from teaching, all this in a country where Catholicism was the predominant religion and where it could mobilize more support than any political group. The left in power openly identified itself with the violent actions: Manuel Azaña, the Prime Minister, said: “all the Madrid convents aren’t worth the life of one republican.”

1932. The anarchists had committed 23 political murders and had launched three revolutionary insurrections. A small sector of the right encouraged a weak military revolt led by General José Sanjurjo in August 1932, which failed because it was ignored by the Army.

1933 -1934. The right wins the election by a big margin (women voted for the first time and were important in the win). The left loses badly, getting only 14% of the vote and 10% of the Parliament seats. The Spanish people was tired of the abuses of the left after their two wild years in government. The 1933 election was the last legal election in the Second Republic. Socialists and left Republicans, defeated, demand (four times!) the cancellation of the election because the right had won, then leave the government and decide on direct action:

“This position was unprecedented in the recent history of European parliamentary regimes … the fact that a majority of the republic’s founders rejected electoral democracy as soon as they lost an election meant that the prospects for democracy were at best uncertain … the left became only more radical and exclusionary, continuing to insist on an all-left regime, while most of the Socialist movement began to embrace violent revolution.” (Payne, 17-18; Moa, Una Hora 051, 13:00)

“The Socialist Revolutionary Committee [led by Fernando Largo Caballero, the ‘Spanish Lenin’] prepared secret instructions calling for the nationalization of land, and the dissolution of all religious orders, the Army, and the Civil Guard … The Committee’s instructions declared that the insurrection must have ‘all the characteristics of a civil war’, its success depending on the ‘breath of its expansion and the violence with which it is carried out’ … The Spanish Socialist insurrection of 1934 was the most elaborately organized and best armed of all insurrectionary actions in Western and Central Europe during the interwar period.” (Payne, 19-21; Moa, Una Hora 050, 15:00)

If it wasn’t sufficently clear, their newspaper El Socialista announced on September 25, 1934: “everyone should give up the idea of peaceful evolution, which is an utopia; blessed be the war.” This is how the insurrection developed: Largo Caballero calls for a general strike in Madrid; an Independent Catalan Republic in Barcelona lasts ten hours; A Workers Commune in Asturias, with Socialist backing, lasts two weeks (mainly because all leftist parties joined the insurrection) and is legally suppressed by General Francisco Franco. The insurrection broke out in fifteen of Spain’s fifty provinces, the revolutionaries murdered about 100 clergy and civilians, and carried out widespread destruction, arson and looting. About 1,500 people died. The insurrection started by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Catalan Separatists against the Spanish Republic in 1934 is is the real beginning of the Spanish Civil War (Moa, Una Hora 084, 14:15). It was also the beginning of the propaganda war, supported by Comintern money and the European left, and the string of lies cited by Paul Johnson:

“The insurrectionist Socialist Party was never outlawed, some of its centers continued to remain open, and after the first weeks the leading prisoners enjoyed special privileges. An international investigating commission was permitted to visit them, and in little more than a year the revolutionaries would be allowed to participate in new democratic elections that offered the opportunity to gain legally the power they had just tried to seize by force. The repression by the Spanish Republic was in fact historically unprecedented in its leniency, and bore not the slightest comparison with the infinitely more brutal policies followed in such circumstances by other countries, even in the cases of democratic regimes.” (Payne, 25)

1936: The results of the February 16 election were inconclusive and fraudulent:

“The final margin in favor of the Popular Front was primarily the result of violence, mob action, and political manipulations that took place between February 16 and March 1 … The most salient electoral fraud, however, took place in the new parliament itself … through fraudulent means, a sufficiently large margin had been created to permit amendment of the Republican Constitution … Electoral democracy had obviously come to an end well before the beginning of the civil war, which may be seen as a consequence, certainly not the cause, of this breakdown.” (Payne, 35-36)

The Popular Front forcefully takes over the government. The burning of churches and convents and opening of prisons begin anew that same night. José Gil Robles, leader of the CEDA, the main right-wing party, warns of a coming civil war forced by the left, and reads to the Parliament a list of atrocities: 160 churches burned, 269 political murders, 1,287 assaults, 69 political offices destroyed, 113 general strikes, 228 partial strikes, 10 newspaper offices destroyed. The last straw: the chief deputy of the right, the parliamentarian José Calvo Sotelo, is murdered by Assault Guards. Two days later Gil Robles publicly accused the government of responsibility. Civil war breaks out a few months later, on 18 July 1936.

Parallels with the Chilean Popular Front in 1973

There are interesting similarities in the general political situation and how it evolved in both countries before the final military decision. Chile and Spain were traditional societies that nevertheless hatched modern, utopian, violent, and intransigent political groups: Communist parties that were puppets of the Soviet Union; revolutionary, violent socialist parties that made their respective communist parties look timid; and even more revolutionary and violent extreme-left groups such as anarchists, the Trotskyist POUM in Spain, and the MIR in Chile. There were no democrats in the Frente Popular (Spain) or in the Unidad Popular (Chile), there were only moderates and revolutionaries. In both countries the revolutionaries defeated the moderates and created a “dual power” in parallel with the legal government. Also in both countries, and against their will, the right and center-right were pushed to unite and to prepare for the worst, and against the common mistake made by the left in both countries, that the right would accept the imposition of socialism without a fight.

More specifically, some individual characters are somehow replicas of each other:

Niceto Alcalá Zamora (Spanish President) and Eduardo Frei (Chilean President) shared the belief that manipulation of the political sphere could prevent the development of social forces that in the end proved to be much greater than anything they could imagine.

Manuel Azaña (Spanish Prime Minister and President) and Salvador Allende (Chilean President), were contradictory characters who shared a strong but naive belief in their personal ability to control and direct the Protean creature that is a revolution.

Fernando Largo Caballero (leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, PSOE) and Carlos Altamirano (Secretary General of the Chilean Socialist Party, PS) shared a belief in violent Marxist revolution, both led the revolutionary wing of their parties, and both called for insurrection when their own parties were leading democratic regimes. Both also saw themselves playing a similar role as Vladimir Lenin during the Russian Revolution.

The main parallel is, of course, that Francisco Franco and Augusto Pinochet saved their countries from totalitarian communist systems, and both started their nations in the path of progress and the eventual return of democracy. The irony of it all is that both hated dictators were, in the last analysis, the saviors of their democracies.


During 1934, when the PSOE carried out a national insurrection, the Catalan Esquerra (left) coordinated their own regional insurrection with the PSOE, and even Prime Minister Manuel Azaña planned two separate coups —against the same Republic Azaña himself led! Two immensely important facts of the civil war, buried under so many lies are, first, that General Franco legally suppressed the 1934 insurrections, and rejected a proposal by the extreme right to seize power himself. And second, that Franco was the last one to rebel in 1936 —against the new revolutionary state— because the only alternative was to let the Reds build Soviet Spain without a fight. As Pío Moa says, Franco did not fight democrats, he fought a coalition of totalitarians, separatists, and coup-plotters.


Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012

Pío Moa, Una Hora con la Historia (YouTube videos in Spanish)

Pío Moa, Cita con la Historia (YouTube videos in Spanish)

Pío Moa, Los Mitos de la Guerra Civil, La Esfera de los Libros, Madrid, 2003 *

* Pío Moa’s book confirms and expands on Payne’s statements. I couldn’t quote his book because I own the Kindle version, which doesn’t have page numbers.

Those Two Pesky Waves

What the conventional wisdom at most saw in Leo Strauss’ The Three Waves of Modernity was the irruption and the eventual defeat of, respectively, Communism and Fascism as the concrete forms of the last two waves. In my opinion that is too schematic and of course obvious. What I believe most important is that, slowly but surely, both of those waves deeply embedded themselves into the original liberalism of the first wave so that, individually and in combination, they completely changed liberalism for the worse and the result is what we have to live with in our time. The rejection of this result is also what we’re beginning to see in the form of Trumpism, populism, and nationalism, what their common enemy generically calls “far right” movements.

The Second Wave, mainly the ideas of Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, beginning in the early 20th century and through the first half of the century turned liberalism in a socialist, collectivist direction (Wilson, FDR and the New Deal, European democratic socialist governments, the normalization of state intervention in the economy, the continuous growth of government and the colossal level of government taxing and spending).

The Third Wave, the ideas of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and others, found fertile ground in the West after World War 2. This period marks the second modification of liberalism on top of the previous one, thus resulting in the strange and contradictory liberalism of today (global corporatism and global governmental organizations but also the complete autonomy of the individual, relativism, and nihilistic hedonism) in such a way that —this is important to understand— practically every major political group and leadership in the West accept the radical changes unconditionally. That’s why I say the traditional left-right fight and liberal-conservative fight have been subsumed in this new global fight, an unprecedented situation that tends to confuse the best minds and needs new ways of looking at it.

The main First-Wave thinkers (Hobbes, Locke, Bacon, Smith, etc.) opened the door to the radical transformation of their ideas by abandoning the classic framework, including what Yoram Hazony calls the Anglo-American conservative tradition. When one reads this article in concert with my idea of modernity, the concept of “conservatism” gets illuminated in a new way.

In the same regard, I strongly recommend this lecture about “Socialism versus the Family” by the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosopher Edward Feser. His blog is also one of the best, worth visiting.

One last thing: one key to understand the modern world is to compare socialism against liberalism, not against “capitalism” or “democracy” or “conservatism” or “libertarianism.” Why? Because one has to study the regime (in the Aristotelian sense), not its particular political, economic, or ideological subsets. And of course, one even more important key is to be able to see modernity in general from outside, beyond the common horizon of all the ideologies it has created.

Some Thoughts

Lincoln couldn’t know that being “the almost chosen people” wasn’t enough to save us. But the most recent data say it clearly: we are dying almost as fast as the rest of the developed world. How fast things change nowadays: Paul Johnson’s article is 12 years old and my first post about demography is only 2 years old. Since we don’t have enough children, Mephistopheles is here to claim his prize, liberal humanity.

Some phenomena, previously unexplained or vague in my mind, that have become clear by the way I now see liberalism:

— Climate Change is a powerful symbol of liberal utopianism and, at the same time, an instrument of global centralization and domination. That it is headed by the United Nations, that it is pushed by the most liberal politicians, and that the name evolved from “global warming” to be able to explain everything, only make it more blatant. It isn’t new in history that scientists lend themselves to serve an ideological objective, selling their objectivity in the interest of the greater good, especially when it is seasoned with savory government grants.

— Open Borders and its convenient UN legal rubber stamp, “migration as a human right,” are blunt liberal instruments of global homogenization and centralization, crude but fast-acting solvents to erase national sovereignty.

— Permanent Intervention and Permanent War are also instruments of liberal domination. I was wrong, it wasn’t just weird neoconservative ideas. And they unveil the big lie that democracies don’t start wars.

Summary About Liberalism

Those of you who have read my first blog posts have noticed the drastic change of opinion through the last couple of years. I hope this post clarifies at least some of the abstruseness. Attending to the suggestion of a good friend and for the benefit of my readers, this is a summary of the following posts. It would perhaps be convenient for readers unfamiliar with the blog to read them first:

I got where I am in political philosophy mainly by interpreting the writings of Leo Strauss on the Enlightenment and on liberalism, by comparing my interpretation to the very different orthodox version of the West Coast Straussians and of conservatives in general, with some help from reading the writings of radical Catholics such as Patrick J. Deneen and Adrian Vermeule. A definitive factor in the change was the revolution in politics brought about by Donald Trump, especially his ability to unmask his opponents, which allowed me to compare the actions and contradictions of the Republican Party USA to those of conservative parties in Western Europe, and to understand the reaction to liberalism currently occurring in Eastern and Southern Europe.

Liberalism has changed over time. This appears rock solid to me although to conservatives it is a preposterous assertion because, I think, they have to hold on to something while lying to themselves and to their constituents. But this is no longer possible after Trump. As it has evolved, liberalism pushes relentlessly forward, and for the first time in modern history its victims see its deadly effects clearly. Again, thanks to the Trump revolution. The fight is still a rearguard action, a defensive battle that started from necessity, a battle for survival imposed on the victims. The fight is nevertheless cosmic and pregnant with consequences for the future of the United States of America and the developed world, a fight more complex than the traditional and simple one of “left vs right.”

“Left vs right” can’t explain why most Republicans and conservatives are globalists. In the USA both wings of liberalism, Democrats and Republicans, are united against Trump, against nationalism and for globalism. They all accept postmodern imposition of “rights” of all kinds with little or no debate or opposition. To push aside the annoying contradictions and to offer a kind of explanation, we had to invent unconvincing theories like “the stupid party” or “Republicans In Name Only,” or “because the left owns the culture,” or that globalism is a wicked secret plan directed by George Soros.

Angelo M. Codevilla is right when he says that we have a ruling class. Pure democracy doesn’t exist outside of Enlightenment propaganda, or outside of our founding myth. All regimes are a variable mix of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Aristocracy is needed either to rule the masses or to control the monarch, or both, and democracy is mostly passive acceptance of either or both of the other two, plus the chance to change the rulers by elections. The ruling class of the USA is the “UniParty,” a similar-thinking liberal elite with token differences which are mainly about the acceleration or rate of change in liberalism’s forward movement. Republicans aren’t stupid, traitors, or cowards. The real reason is that it is much more difficult for them to appear to support nationalist, pro-American policies while hiding their globalist intentions, a problem the Democrats don’t have. The elites aren’t “out of touch” either. The ones really out of touch are the analysts who can’t see the changes, who see liberalism as frozen in time since 1800.

As Ryszard Legutko writes, late liberalism has striking similarities to socialist and corporatist regimes, that’s why the most modern and liberal companies, high-tech, seem to be socialist, a mirage that reinforces the traditional idea of the fight being “left vs right.”

Most of the real oppositions can be explained by Tocqueville’s and Strauss’ remains-of-previous-eras theories and the classes that embody them nowadays, the middle class and the working class. In reality, the “left vs right” mantra hides most of the things that are really important. The Trump movement can’t be called right-wing in any way, except lazy ideological expediency. On the opposite side, saying that some group or vision is “neo-Marxist” is the traditional form of analysis; it could be so, but only because neo-Marxism is part of the complex and contradictory mixture that is late liberalism.

This can be clearly seen in Europe where all groups and parties, from greens to conservatives, are liberal, and where all of them close ranks against any groups, individuals and parties that dare to defend traditions, nationalism, religion, natural law, virtue ethics, or even human nature. One example is Spain, where all parties are liberal and have concocted, without any debate or opposition, literal translations of hate crimes (delitos de odio), gender (género), LGBTQ (LGBTI), diversity (diversidad), etc., which are then imposed on the population. In Spain too we find the same explanations about the Spanish right’s actions: they are “traitors,” “collaborators,” in “moral decay” or “have forgotten.” This seems almost childish, but it’s true: the left vs right fight can’t explain anything but is used to explain everything. And another clarifying fact in Europe is that the center of the opposition to liberalism is set in Eastern and Southern Europe (less advanced regions = less liberal).

Finally, the left is not the cause of the problems of late liberalism. Just the opposite, late liberalism has made the left important beyond their real numbers because liberalism keeps individuals atomized in extremis, thus at the mercy of government, and because liberalism points to an utopian, collectivist global government. Both are raisons d’être of the world left.

Vladimir Dorta, 11/05/2018

Understanding the Modern World (II)

In this post I want to give an overall account of two previous ones, trying to make sense of our strange and fast-changing times. While I write it, I’m reading Ryszard Legutko’s The Demon in Democracy, a book that helps clarify the critical issues and one I can’t recommend highly enough.

Choosing among the several meanings of the word and following those previous posts, I understand liberalism as the political, economic, and social system of modernity, the historical era that started with the American and French revolutions. Liberalism is, in classical political terms, the regime * of developed Western societies.

More specifically, liberalism is a historicist utopia with a slight kink: it evolves over time. It is historicist because it embodies the idea of progress in a linear historical development, and utopian because it will eventually actualize human happiness in this world, much as a secular religion. The Novus Ordo Seclorum brought about by the Enlightenment has been immensely successful, quite beyond anything its founders could imagine. They, however, thought it would be there for the ages, not changing essentially over time. But, as I have written before, it has evolved and this fact alone changes everything we think we know about modernity.

Since it is the only surviving system that incarnates the idea of progress, liberalism must defeat any opponent who is seen as retrograde or obsolete; as a hegemonic regime it can’t accept any competitors, they all must be destroyed. And as it changes, it is no longer the “classic liberalism” of the origins —the one that conservatives talk and dream about. Its current dominant form, postmodernism, is the point of a new and dangerous spear that magically transforms any new desire into a “right” and ruthlessly crushes all traditional beliefs. Liberalism is about power, power to change, power to destroy everything in its wake, and power to plow ahead to fulfill the utopia: to reach the end of the arc of history, a global society with a global government. From this point of view, globalization is a normal tendency of the economic form of late liberalism, as the new multicultural, medieval society of seigneurs and serfs takes shape right in front of us in California, for example.

Contrary to what conventional wisdom tells us, liberalism, the regime of modernity, is widely accepted by modern societies. One important key to understand this is how rapidly the majority in America and Europe embraces each new imposition, each new right and entitlement, no matter how absurd or worthless. And —very important— the accepting includes conservatives and the right, most of whom are as liberal as their opponents, only pharisaic. The only big difference is the activism on the left, because they consider themselves a “vanguard” as in the other utopia.

As Legutko (who is a member of the European Parliament) writes:

“What we have been observing over the last decades is an emergence of a kind of liberal-democratic general will. Whether the meaning of the term itself is identical with that used by Rousseau is of negligible significance. The fact is that we have been more and more exposed to an overwhelming liberal-democratic omnipresence, which seems independent of the will of individuals, to which they humbly submit, and which they perceive as compatible with their innermost feelings. This will permeates public and private lives, emanates from the media, advertising, films, theatre and visual arts, expresses itself through common wisdom and persistently brazen stereotypes, through educational curricula from kindergarten to universities, and through works of art. This liberal-democratic general will does not recognize geographical or political borders. And although it does not have a control center or an executive body, it seems to move forward relentlessly and to conquer new territories as if under a single well-structured and well-organized command … The liberal-democratic general will reaches the area that Rousseau never dreamt of—language, gestures, and thoughts.” (Op. cit., p. 65)

In this cosmic fight, who are liberalism’s opponents or rather, who are the hegemon’s victims?

First, let me say what the fight isn’t about: it is not “right vs left,” it is not “populism vs democracy,” it is not “nationalism vs globalism,” it is not “mainstream vs far-right,” and it’s not “protectionism” or “isolationism” vs free trade. Yes, there is some basic truth to all of those oppositions, but highlighting any one of them only helps veil the important truth:

The fight is about wiping out and trying to avoid being wiped out.

As examples of conventional wisdom, Americans who voted for Trump in 2016 have been called “poor economic losers,” although the median income of Trump voters was $72,000, compared to the national median of $52,000. They have also been presented as “angry old men,” although 41% of white millennials turned out for Trump. In Europe, the same liberal analysts tell us, they are “old pensioners with vague memories of Hitler,” but the German AfD Party appeals to people aged 25-50 who never knew Nazism, and Marine Le Pen won more people aged 18-34 than any other candidate in the first round of the French elections.

The apparent central fight between left and right can be seen in America due to its particular two-party political system and the fact that the society is more or less evenly divided. Why? Because only in America among developed societies, the remains of previous eras are still strong: religion, traditions, normal families, virtue ethics, patriotism, small business, etc., something we know since Tocqueville. The classes that embody those characteristics are the middle class and the working class, a citizenry that is majority white. That is the real enemy liberalism must wipe out.

The truth can be seen more clearly in Europe, where practically all mainstream parties and groups are openly liberal, and religion and traditions don’t count as heavily as in America, and where liberalism doesn’t hide totalitarian tendencies such as forcing Marine Le Pen to undergo psychiatric tests.

Beginning in the coming November elections we’ll see just how strong those remains are. Under President Trump’s leadership they are a light of hope, especially if they can forge alliances with European nationalists. Long-term, besides understanding the issue clearly and acting upon it, the key to their eventual survival, security, and even triumph is bringing children to the world. This could also be a Pyrrhic victory for either side, as demographic collapse seems to be a key characteristic of late liberalism.

Vladimir Dorta, 10/11/2018


Ryszard Legutko, The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies, Encounter Books, NY-London, 2016.

* Regime: “the politieia, the order, the form, which gives society its character, its specific manner of life. Regime is the form of life as living together, the manner of living in a society and in society, since this manner depends decisively on the predominance of human beings of a certain type, on the manifest domination of society by human beings of a certain type. Regime means that whole, which we today are in the habit of viewing primarily in a fragmentized form: regime means simultaneously the form of life of a society, its style of life, its moral taste, the form of society, the form of state, the form of government, the spirit of laws.”
Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, The University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 34.

When Everything Seems To Be Upside Down

The fight to the death between globalism and nationalism unfolding right before our eyes could well be the definitive fight between good and evil. Because the prize couldn’t be any bigger: controlling the United States of America and influencing the future of the world.

Since I’m a pessimist, at the beginning —even if I was one of the first believers— I didn’t give the American nationalist movement led by President Trump any chance, and I still don’t give it any chance in Europe. On the other hand, if there is a place for a movement like this to triumph and keep the flame alive it’s America, always ready to show her exceptionalism. America is the only country that can confront globalism and the collectivist push for global government. And a person like Donald Trump can only be born and succeed —to the extreme of being elected President against all odds and when he didn’t have to try— in America.

But the fight is still unequal.

A coup d’état was in place, directed by the Obama White House —as recognized by James Clapper, as written in the Strzok-Page emails, and as shown by the Carter Page warrant without a court order— with the immediate goal to depose a legally elected president, and whose final goal was to secure permanent hegemony for the Democrat Party in order to build socialism in America. The coup is still going on. The body of the coup is the “resistance” of the Democrat Party; the media and the cultural industry are its accomplices, and the Republican establishment tacitly sides with them by washing its dirty hands, keeping mostly silent at the onslaught. And one more: the Special Counsel investigation is the always important “legal” face of the coup. This is an unprecedented moment in the history of America: The bad guys assume their new personas and their new places in the revolution, getting ready to take the Bastille. On the opposite side, President Trump is almost alone, fighting for us. Unless he has an ace up his sleeve, like a real-world James Bond and the perfect leader for his time, this will end badly.

But our guy is such a fighter that the “resistance” is desperate and reckless, and the reasons why are clear: no president in history has done as much for his country and his fellow citizens as Donald Trump has in as short a time. This is especially dangerous for Democrats, the revolutionary left, socialism, Antifa, the globalists. If Donald Trump wins, they are all kaput.

Why do the rest of the people, the reasonable citizens, supposedly the majority, appear to be indifferent and above the fray? Because modern, developed liberal societies are ill-prepared to counter something like this. The revolutionary left never rests, it is always on a war footing, and this is something the liberal right has never understood. The right is principled, sanctimonious, well-meant, and cowardly. That is easy to see both from a Marxist perspective (“the bourgeoisie will sell us the rope with which we’ll hang them”) and from Lockean principles (“peaceable acquisition”). Liberalism is about fair play, free elections, and faithful opposition. And that is also why the left’s “fascism everywhere” talking point is absurd. One side doesn’t see or tends to ignore the fight because it takes the original Enlightenment seriously; the other side doesn’t rest and propels the revolution forward because they are heirs of the thinkers who radicalized the Enlightenment.

What happens in Europe and America today is a sharpening of the crisis of liberalism that has developed as the destruction of Western civilization, the greatest ever, the one that began on the plains of ancient Greece, that radially created a new world starting from a tiny center in Rome; that later dominated the world out of a small island, Britain, and that reached its zenith in America. The destruction flows from the inside: the hippies, the new left, academia, Hollywood, the media, postmodernism, radicalized political parties, and the masters of the global economy. As I have written before, this is the result of the evolution of liberalism itself.

I like American Westerns, including the spaghetti ones, but a happy ending is not always a given because some problems don’t have practical solutions, and inventing theoretical solutions only amounts to an intellectual exercise. I can imagine a nationalist alliance of America, the UK, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Italy, but let’s wait and see what happens.

Vladimir Dorta